Introduction
Joint Force Commanders of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries experience an advantage as a result of technology development and adaptation for force applications. The ability of the United States to exploit that technological advantage has been largely dependent on the military's access to the space dimension. The duration of any operational advantage will depend on the ability of the United States to deny the access of processed information through the space dimension to its adversaries while it protects its own access. This quest for information superiority in Joint Operations will also depend upon the government's ability to recognize the functional relationship of technology transfer over time and the need for disciplined investment. In the commercial space segment, the United States has rarely been able to exercise control. With the current and projected continuance of the military's dependence upon the commercial space segment, it is imperative that the United States develops a strategy that regains the initiative and enables the attainment of an information superiority capability.
Analogy of Space to Air, Land and Sea
Consider the challenges that military commanders have historically faced in order to control the dimensions of land, sea, and air. Land operations have traditionally been bound by rate of movement, employment of terrain to an advantage for both offense and defense, and access. Access to land can be constrained by weather, topography, obstacles, and approach (by sea, land, air and space). Maneuver became the primary principle of war that dictated movement to gain advantage over an adversary at the time, place and force level of a commander's choosing. Certain technologies have enabled a military force or capability to maneuver but history illustrates that it was not until the twentieth century that maneuver became a doctrinal element of the operational art.
One only needs to study the First World War to realize that mankind wasted multiple generations of its populace ignoring obvious opportunities and alternatives to attritional warfare. Sea power is another dimension that nations attempted to understand and control for centuries. Those that were successful prospered economically, diplomatically and culturally. The factors have always been access, control and employment of the sea dimension. Many nations and cultures have been able to exploit the sea for regional advantage since the Peloponnesian War but it was not until the European nations explored the sea dimension for global access to resources and trade routes that international commerce truly evolved. Colonization of lands on separate continents provided great reward to those nations that invested in capital ships and their employment as instruments of area access and denial.
Control of the sea is perhaps the most attributable reason for the rise of the United States as a global power in the twentieth century. It is an advantage the United States still maintains but it could easily be lost if the investment and re-capitalization initiatives are diminished. Regional navies of adversaries would logically gain operational advantage if the United States failed to maintain its investment in a global capability. Access to the dimension of the sea and the ability to deny the same dimension to its adversary is vital to the United States.
The evolution of airpower and its employment (again access and denial) have been even more crucial to maneuver and the empowerment of the land and sea forces. The tremendous relative advantage that the United States enjoys today is yet another slow lesson learned. Development of air doctrine in the early twentieth century was significant to the success the United States achieved in World War II but it fatally ignored opportunities to achieve a more relative advantage. The failure to fully develop the integration of strategic and operational air with the amphibious and land based operations resulted in lessons learned similar to historical failures of nations to integrate land and sea forces. The United States learned that air could enhance sea power and that "sea and land based airpower were necessary adjuncts to each other." It was stated in 1945 that the best employment of air power was through "a joint air command and control system under the authority of a single naval 
Current Situation in Space
The growth of the commercial and industrial programs in space by all countries of the world has been phenomenal over the past twelve years. There are two unique differences about the commercial assets that are currently in orbit. First is the fact that the platforms provide dual use technologies. Unlike commercial shipping or aircraft that are limited to dual-purpose functionality for transport only, satellites enable real time information access that can be employed for either civilian or military applications. Space capabilities include voice, facsimile, messaging, paging and data transfer communications as well as imagery with resolution to one-half meter. Space capabilities also include continuous tracking, navigation, meteorology, and remote sensing.
The second unique difference is that the majority of the assets are financed, owned and Marginal increases were made to enhance commercial capacity but the large deficiency in capacity was never programmed for investment. Part of the problem was the failure to project a more accurate demand for SATCOM. The more accurate projection during 1997 was 20 GBps (more than five times the GAO projection). xv The bottom line is that these studies failed to spark substantial investments for SATCOM capacity. Even more alarming is that 60% of the total military bandwidth today comes from the commercial sector and that the dependence on the commercial sector will increase to 90% by the year 2010.
xvi Control. The Air Force Doctrine Document for Space Operations states that "space control is the means by which space superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy." xvii It expands the doctrine and further states that "counter-space is the mission carried out to achieve space control objectives" and it "includes offensive and defensive operations." What is not addressed in the doctrine for counterspace operations is any mention of commercial space systems. In fact, the United States Air Force There are multiple competitors in the commercial space segment with access and routine demand for voice and data communications, imagery, meteorology and remote sensing capabilities over the Arabian Peninsula (many corporate and official entities in France, China, Japan, Russia, India, and the ARABSAT consortium). Even governments are disseminating space information to satisfy commercial demand. The Russian Space Agency is "now selling the data from military space systems over the internet" because they are unable to fund their "space research and development Two likely offensive threats that the U.S. must plan to counter in the near term are the employment of anti-satellite systems and the probability of a low earth orbit nuclear detonation.
PRC tested an anti-satellite system in late 1999 that is capable of interfering with any commercial or military space system in any type of orbit (to include entire constellations and the space station).
xxv This system has the capability to launch nanometer sized parasitic satellites that track, attach to or destroy targeted satellites. The parasitic satellites can be employed offensively or programmed to remain dormant until remotely activated by ground controllers. The PRC did not conceptualize this capability. The "soft killing" approach to satellites was initially presented by Alvin and Heidi
Toffler in 1993. xxvi Despite its origin, development of this application has now enabled the PRC capability to control the use of space.
It is probable that the employment of space-based weapons will eventually include the use of inertia weapons to include laser and photon technologies. Although it is estimated that constellations of space based lasers will not appear until 2020, there is a scenario which is plausible today. xxvii American space war games throughout the 1990s included the scenario in which a nation deploys and detonates an "exo-atmospheric nuclear weapon to create artificial radiation belts at low earth orbit altitudes." xxviii The possibility is only remote because it would also deny access to the commercial assets by any nation or commercial user. Despite the results of the war games, DOD has failed to develop policies or establish funding for hardening of commercial satellites.
Current Strategies
The satellite industry is not the first entity that illustrated that the commercial sector is no (2) Cost is not the only criterion. Access, control and protection are high priorities.
DOD must develop operational concepts that enable flexibility with commercial systems that mitigate vulnerability to enemy disruption, failures or market forces.
(4) It would be more economical to make long term commitments and waste capacity than to underestimate needs that can not be met on an ad-hoc basis.
(5) Long term savings of leasing should prohibit buying DOD unique satellites.
DOD should lease satellites based on the required operational requirements. weapons is usually the collateral damage the attack causes on other satellites in similar orbits. At a minimum, the government must deal with the reality that there exists a conventional threat from PRC in space.
The two previous alternative strategies are capability based approaches and do not address the intangible benefits of adapting a coherent space strategy. There was an advanced research project xxxv completed by two students at the Naval War College in 2001 that addressed the policies and directives that contribute to the availability and survivability of commercial space systems.
Their summary conclusions specifically recommend that the U.S. needs to establish doctrine and develop a national space security strategy, invest to maintain a space technology industrial base, and establish a budget process that enables the employment of the commercial space sector. Its recommendation for the development of a national space security strategy will be paramount to the long term access and control of space by the United States.
Conclusion
The recurring theme that technology transfer over time renders an advantage lost is perhaps the most important lesson this paper has supported. Mankind's access to space for any purpose is no It is critical to the United States that it maintains a position of information superiority across the spectrum of military operations. The access to commercial satellite systems will be a critical but challenging element of that advantage. Success will depend upon the practice of disciplined investment in space technologies as well as alternatives to reduce the dependence upon their limited capacity. It will also require the eventual development of force applications to counter known and probable threats to all space-based systems. Change is required now. Without guaranteed access to the required capacity for bandwidth, the U.S. technological advantage will be mitigated.
